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MAY-JUNE 1959
CASE COMMENTS
Automobiles - Guest Statutes -
Change of Guest Status
By HARMON S. GRAVES III
William Andrews was drinking in a bar and looking for com-
pany for a trip. Nell Kirk, who had gone out with him a few times
before, accepted his invitation when her girl friend, Ann Coppinger,
agreed to go along with them. They had driven only a short dis-
tance when Andrews began swerving the car while laughing and
talking to the girls. Both girls protested, and as an answer Andrews
increased his speed. Nell requested repeatedly to be let out of the
car, right up to the time Andrews entered a curve at eighty-five
miles per hour causing the car to leave the road and overturn sev-
eral times. All three occupants were injured. The court held that
when one accepts an invitation to become a passenger in an auto-
mobile, without prior knowledge that the driver is likely to drive
dangerously, and the passenger is put in fear of serious harm from
such conduct, a protest against negligent driving, coupled with a
demand to be let out of the car, will change the status of the guest
to that of involuntary passenger if the demand is refused. Andrews
v. Kirk, 106 So. 2nd 110 (Fla. 1958).
The question of change of status met squarely in this case im-
mediately raises the more inclusive question of whether, by allow-
ing a change of status and thus permitting a rider to recover for
injuries caused by simple negligence, the protection intended by the
guest statutes for the automobile host is abrogated.
In the absence of statute, the majority view under the common
law requires the driver to exercise reasonable care toward his in-
vited guest in the operation of the vehicle.' But the application of
the law of real property normally gives the gratuitous guest the
status of a licensee.2 This means that the operator is not required
to make the vehicle safe for the guest, but that the operator owes
the guest the duty merely of not increasing the existing hazards of
travel nor creating new peril.3
The reasoning appears to be that permission to ride in the auto-
mobile of another is essentially the same as permission to enter and
use another's premises. Under such conditions, the operator owes
the guest a duty to exercise reasonable care, or, expressed in terms
of negligence, he is liable to his guest for ordinary negligence.
4
It is primarily against this background that the legislatures in
numerous states have enacted statutory changes in the common law
rule of ordinary negligence. Much the same result achieved through
the "guest statutes" was effected in the minority states under the
common law by holding the operator liable to the gratuitous guest
only for gross negligence.'
1 Annot., 20 A.L.R. 1016 (1922).
2 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Low and Practice, § 2295, pt. 1 (perm. ed. 1946).
3 Perkins v. Galloway, 194 Ala. 265, 69 So. 875 (1915).
4 Dickerson v. Connecticut Co., 98 Conn. 87, 118 Atl. 518 (1922).
5 E.g., Epps v. Parrish, 26 Ga. App. 255, 195 S.E. 226 (1938).
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Perhaps the most emphatic language justifying the adoption of
"guest statutes" is that of a Colorado case, Dobbs v. Sugioka: 
6
"Clearly they were enacted to prevent recovery by those
who had no moral right to recompense, those carried for
their own convenience, for their own business or pleasure,
those invited by the operator as a mere generous gesture,
'hitchhikers' and 'bums' who sought to make profit out of
softhearted and unfortunate motorists."
Stated in more general terms, the guest statutes were de-
signed to relieve the severity of the common law rule which re-
quires the driver, under the majority view, to exercise ordinary
care even to a recipient of his kindness and hospitality.
7
Guest statutes of the several states have restricted the com-
mon law liability in varying degrees. An extreme example is a
requirement in the Washington statute8 expressed in Atkins v.
Hemphill9 There, a sixteen-year-old girl accepted an invitation to
ride with the defendant, but upon discovering he had been drinking
and was driving in a negligent manner, she demanded to be let out
of the car. Her request, although repeated frequently, was refused.
While attempting to pass one truck, the defendant collided with
6 117 Colo. 210, 185 P.2d 784 (1947).
7 4 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, § 2292, pt.1, at 305 (perm. ed. 1946).
For a discussion of the pros and cons of guest statutes see Kripke, Should Colorado Retain the "Guest
Sfatute"?-Public Policy v. Insurance Policy, 35 DICTA 179 (1958) and Wormwood, In Defense of the
Colorado Guest Statute, 35 DICTA 174 (1958).
8 Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 6360-121 (1937).
5 33 Wash. 2d 735, 207 P.2d 195 (1949).
Throw a line around your
TITLE and ABSTRACT Problems
Yes indeed! Whatever your title or abstract needs in Colo-
rado, Title Guaranty Company and its affiliated companies
will provide complete service, , and promptly!
The TITLE GUARANTY COMPANY
1711 CALIFORNIA STREET KEystone 4-1251
JEFFERSON COUNTY ABSTRACT CO.




another. The court held that the girl's demands did not terminate
her status as a guest within the requirements of the local guest
statute, which disallowed recovery for all but "intentional" acci-
dents.
This case should be viewed in light of the question: "Who is a
guest for the purposes of the automobile guest statutes?" General-
ly, a "guest" may be defined as one who voluntarily accepts the
hospitality of another, and the term normally excludes one who has
such hospitality forced upon him.10 For example, a kidnapped or
abducted person who is driven in a car is an involuntary rider and
is outside the statute." It would appear, then, that one who is not
voluntarily in the car would not be a guest and subject to the guest
statute. Unfortunately, Washington has taken the view that once
the guest status has been created it continues for the duration of
the trip.
12
There is general agreement that a guest's simple protest to
negligent driving, unaccompanied by a demand to be let out, is
insufficient to terminate the guest status.13
Change of status of a guest was allowed in the Georgia case of
Blanchard v. Ogletree."4 The holding of this case was adopted by
the Florida court in the instant case, but it must be noted that Geor-
gia does not have a guest statute and it is a minority state under the
common law, limiting the driver's liability to gross negligence.
1 5
In Blanchard the court held that one who rode gratuitously in an-
other's automobile became engaged in a joint enterprise and as-
sumed the risk of the driver's ordinary negligence. But, when the
passenger requested to leave the car, she withdrew from the joint
enterprise and no longer assumed the risk. Thus, the driver was
liable for ordinary negligence when he refused the rider's request.
The views of the Florida and Georgia courts appear to reflect
the underlying purpose of the guest statutes without generally
subjecting the automobile host to the consequences of ordinary
negligence. Florida permits a change of status under its guest stat-
ute16 which is similar to those enacted in most states; i.e., it requires
a showing of at least gross negligence, and Georgia takes a similar
stand under the minority common law view.
Some courts have reached the same result without squarely
facing the question. This they have done by making the refusal of
the host to allow the guest to depart, one of the elements leading
to a finding of gross negligence. 17 Nothing seems to indicate that a
person who is invited as a gratuitous guest must remain one. The
basis of the host-guest relationship is one of mutual consent and a
withdrawal of consent by the guest ought to end the guest status.
10 Kudrna v. Adamski, 188 Ore. 396, 216 P.2d 262 (1950).
11 Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1958) (dictum).
12 Taylor v. Toug, 17 Wash. 2d 533, 136 P.2d 176 (1943).
13 Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1448 (1952).
1441 Go. App. 2, 152 S.E. 116 (1930).
15 Ibid.
16 Fla. Ann. Stat. § 320.59 (1953).
17 E.g., Berman v. Berman, 110 Conn. 69, 147 AtI. 568 (1929).
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Automobiles-Vehicles At Rest Or Unattended-Non-Liability Of
Owner To Third Person Injured By Automobile Driven By
Escaping Thief
By JOHN L. RICH
In violation of a city ordinance, the defendant left the keys in
the ignition switch of her unlocked, parked automobile. The auto-
mobile was stolen, and sometime later, while being pursued by po-
lice, the thief lost control of the automobile, damaging the plaintiff's
grape arbor. The parties agreed that the collision and damage did
not occur in the act of theft or in immediate pursuit thereafter.
Held: Plaintiff's declaration dismissed. The ordinance imposes upon
an owner no duty making him liable to a third person whom a
thief might negligently injure. Therefore, the plaintiff was not
within the class of persons whom the ordinance was designed to
protect. Corinti v. Wittkopp, 93 N.W.2d 906 (Mich. 1959).
Under the common law rule where there is no statute or or-
dinance involved it is generally held that an automobile owner is
not liable for the negligence of a thief where the owner has left his
keys in the ignition switch.1 However, some courts have indicated
that even though a statute or ordinance is not involved, the owner
might be held liable if the circumstances were such that the theft
and the subsequent negligence of the thief were reasonably foresee-
able by the owner.2 These courts have placed an owner of an auto-
mobile under a duty to exercise such care as a person of ordinary
prudence would exercise in leaving an automobile upon a public
street.
The reasoning of the courts has been complicated by statutes or
ordinances which prohibit an automobile driver from leaving his
automobile unattended with the keys in the ignition.3 The majority
of cases involving such statutes or ordinances have held the owner
1 Bennett v. Arctic Insulation, Inc., 253 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1950); Holder v. Poperaden, 146 Cal.
App. 2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956); Wagner v. Arthur, 134 N.E.2d 409 (Ohio C.P. 1956). But see Schaff
v. R. W. Claxton, Inc., 144 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
2 Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 54 A.2d 520 (1947); Williams v. Mickens, 247 N.C. 262, 100
S.E.2d 511 (1957); Reti v. Vaniska, Inc., 14 N.J. Super. 94, 81 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1951).
3 See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-4-76 (1953); Denver, Colo., Rev. Munic. Code § 518.7 (1950).
YOUR OFFICE SAFE
may be safe enough for ordinary purposes but your important documents
should be in a SAFE DEPOSIT BOX in our new modern vault, designed
for both safety and convenience.
A whole year for as little as $5 plus tax.
COLORADO STATE BANK,
OF DENVER - SIXTEENTH AT BROADWAY
Member Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
not liable to third persons for the negligent acts of a thief.4 How-
ever, a respectable minority of co,.rts have held the owner liable
because of the statute or ordinance involved. The principal case
represents the majority view on this problem."
While the majority view has held the owner not liable, the
courts have reached this result by various lines of reasoning.7 The
general theme seems to be that the owner's original act of leaving
the keys in the ignition switch is not the proximate cause of the
third person's injuries." The proximate cause is the negligent driv-
ing of the thief.9 This negligence of the thief has been called an in-
tervening efficient cause 0 or an intervening independent act 1
which interrupts the chain of causation between the owner's act
and the third person's injuries.
It has become necessary for the courts to determine the intent
of the legislative body in enacting the ordinance or statute. The
second line of reasoning arriving at the majority result is that such
an ordinance or statute is enacted for the protection of the automo-
bile owner and as an aid to proper law enforcement rather than to
prevent negligent driving from the scene of a car theft.1 2 The min-
ority view has interpreted such ordinances or statutes as safety
measures intended to prevent injuries to the public.13
Occasionally the ordinance or statute itself will contain an ex-
clusionary sentence stating that it shall have no bearing in any
civil action. 14 Since the obvious intent of an ordinance or statute
containing this proviso is that a violation should not affect civil lia-
bility, the third person is not one of the class of persons for whose
benefit it was enacted and, hence, cannot recover from the owner
for the negligent act of the thief. 5
The minority view considers an ordinance or statute prohibit-
ing an owner from leaving the keys in the ignition switch of his
automobile not an anti-theft measure for the benefit of the owner,
but rather as a measure designed to promote the public safety.
16 It
is notable that in every case upholding the minority rule, the injury
or damage to the third person occurred during the act of theft or
during immediate pursuit. The courts seem to emphasize this fact
by saying that an owner should foresee that a thief who steals his
automobile will be negligent when fleeing from the scene of the
4 Frank v. Ralston, 248 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1957); Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23
(1954); Kiste v. Red Cob, Inc., 122 Ind. App. 587, 108 N.E.2d 395 (1952); Galbraith v. Levin, 323
Mass. 225, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1948); Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927); An-
derson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950); Gower v. Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App.
1955).
5 Ross v. iHortman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944); Ney v. Yellow
Cab Co., 2 Ill. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954); Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 III. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537
(1948); Garbo v. Walker, 57 Ohio Op. 363, 129 N.E.2d 537 (C.P. 1955).
6 Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 633 (1957).
7 Note, 1951 Wis. L. Rev. 740.
8 See generally Galbraith v. Levin, 323 Mass. 225, 81 N.E.2d 560 (1958); Anderson v. Theisen,
231 Min. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
9 Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. 359, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945); Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369,
43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
10 Anderson v. Theisen, supra note 9 (alternative holding).
11 Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N.E. 778 (1927).
12 Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950) (alternative holding).
13 Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 790 (1944); Ney v. Yel-
low Cab Co., 2 III. 2d 74, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954).
14 For cases construing such ordinances or statutes, see Richards v. Stanley, 43 Col. 2d 60, 271
P.2d 23 (1954); Gower v. Lamb, 282 S.W.2d 867 (Mo. App. 1955).
15 Gower v. Lamb, supro note 14.
16 Cases cited note 5 supra.
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theft.1 7 However, the fallacy of this is that an owner would have
no reason to foresee that a thief might be negligent, since a thief,
in order not to attract attention, may be very careful when leaving
the scene of the theft. 8 A recent case, which held an owner not
liable, has repudiated any distinction between an injury occurring
while the thief is fleeing and one occurring after the theft has been
completed. 19 If no distinction is made, the minority rule would ap-
parently hold an owner liable even though a thief injured a third
person weeks or months after the theft. While the minority posi-
tion has been rationalized on the grounds of public policy,20 such an
extreme position "goes far towards making the defendant an insurer
as to the consequences of every accident in which his automobile
might become involved while operated by the original thief or his
successors in possession."
2 1
The court in the instant case reasoned that the ordinance did
not impose a duty upon the driver to remove his keys from the igni-
tion switch for the benefit of third persons whom a theif might
negligently injure. Therefore, the liability sought to be imposed
was beyond the scope of duty required by the ordinance. The same
result of non-liability would have been reached whether the court
reasoned that the conduct of the thief was an intervening cause
breaking the chain of causation between the defendant's act of leav-
ing her keys in the ignition switch and the subsequent injury to
the plaintiff or, as the court did reason, that the plaintiff was not
within the class of persons whom the ordinance was designed to
protect.
Obviously the court reached the right decision by following the
majority rule. However, since it was agreed by the parties that the
damage did not occur during the actual perpetration of the theft or
in immediate pursuit thereafter, it is still possible that the Michigan
court may make a distinction in a proper case and hold an automo-
bile owner liable to a third person where a thief negligently injures
such third person during or just after a car theft. Thus, the instant
court may find that an owner owes a duty to a plaintiff who is in-
jured by a thief driving away from the place of his theft. It would
have been better had the court reasoned that the negligent driving
of the thief was the legal cause22 of the plaintiff's damage. It would
be more difficult for the court to make any future distinction based
on time of injury if the reasoning had been in terms of legal cause
rather than on the ground that the defendant owed no duty to this
particular plaintiff. Then all doubt would have been removed as to
whether or not an automobile owner will be liable in the future to
third persons injured by a thief fleeing the scene of his theft.
17 See, e.g., Ostergard v. Frisch, 333 III. App. 359, 77 N.E.2d 537 (1948)
18 Holder v. Poperaden, 146 Cal. App. 2d 557, 304 P.2d 204 (1956);- Soocco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J.
Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1951).
19 Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950).
20 Comment, 34 Iowa L. Rev. 376 (1949).
21 Curtis v. Jacobson, 142 Me. 351, 362, 54 A.2d 520, 525 (1947).
22 For a definition of "legal cause," see Restatement, Torts § 9 (1934).
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Constitutional Law - Commerce and Due Process Clauses - State
Regulation of Interstate Commerce - State Taxing Power
By ANNE DOUTHIT
The state income tax laws of both Minnesota and Georgia levy
taxes on the net income of foreign corporations whose business
within the taxing state consists exclusively of interstate commerce.
The taxes are imposed only on that portion of net income which is
earned from and fairly apportioned to activities within the taxing
state. The statutes were attacked as violating the commerce and
due process clauses of the United States Constitution. The Minne-
sota Supreme Court upheld Minnesota's tax, but Georgia's law was
declared invalid by that state's court. The United States Supreme
Court noted jurisdiction of the appeal in the Minnesota case and
granted certiorari in the Georgia case. The objecting taxpayers
were foreign corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of
products from plants located outside the taxing states. Each main-
tained a sales office within the state from which salesmen solicited
orders in the area. Orders were approved in the home offices and
shipments were sent directly to the customers. Neither merchan-
dise inventories nor property, other than office furniture, was lo-
cated within the taxing states; nor was any capital employed in the
states other than expenditures for office rent, salesmen's salaries
and incidental selling expenses. In each case, a substantial portion
of the taxpayer's total sales volume was affected.
The Court held that both of the statutes in question were valid.
The opinion declared that net income from the interstate operations
of a foreign corporation may be subjected to state taxation provided
the levy is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to activi-
ties within the taxing state. Maintaining a sales office for the
solicitation of interstate sales is sufficient activity within the state
to subject the selling organization to an obligation to share in the
cost of local government. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co.
v. Minnesota, 79 Sup. Ct. 357 (1959).
-The conflict between the states' taxing power, and the power of
Congress to regulate commerce between and among the states has
endured a long and stormy history in the courts. The economic
growth of this country, the attendant mushrooming of commerce
across state lines, and the increasing revenue requirements of state
and local governments, have gradually made it necessary for the
courts to distinguish between those taxes which are regulatory in
nature, and those which merely prorate the costs of local govern-
ment over all local activities.
Out of the several hundred cases reviewed by the Supreme
Court have evolved a number of tests for determining the validity
and constitutionality of state taxing measures. Fundamental to the
entire line of cases is the rule that the tax cannot impose a direct
restriction on interstate commerce.1 Nor can it be discriminatory,
favoring purely local or intrastate activity.2 Therefore, a tax im-
posed upon the privilege of carrying on interstate business is not
1 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
within the power of a state.' Some taxing formulas have been de-
clared unenforceable because they have attempted to subject inter-
state commerce to multiple taxation, an undue burden which would
seriously impede commerce among the states.4 The taxation of
property after it has come to rest within a state, 5 and the imposition
of sales taxes on certain interstate transactions have been upheld.
The leading case dealing with the taxation of net income from
interstate commerce is United States Glue Co. v. Town of Oak
Creek.7 There the taxpayer was a domestic corporation. The case
established that a net income tax is not a direct, but an incidental,
burden on interstate commerce. It was concluded that such a tax,
as long as it is nondiscriminatory, is one of the general burdens of
government from which persons and corporations otherwise subject
to the state's jurisdiction cannot be exempted. While the language
did not limit the application of the rule to domestic corporations, it
implied that a foreign corporation, to be so taxed, must at least be
subject to the state's jurisdiction, and be entitled to the rights and
privileges accorded domestic corporations. In order for a foreign
corporation to acquire such rights, normally it must qualify to do
business in the state, and thus become domiciled.
The question of taxation of income earned within the borders
of the taxing state by a person outside that state's jurisdiction was
discussed in Shaffer v. Carter.I However, the facts in that case were
not comparable to the present fact situation because interstate ac-
tivity was not involved. In the Shaffer case, Oklahoma was at-
tempting to tax a nonresident's income which derived from oil and
gas leases and properties located in Oklahoma. The case turned on
the fact that Oklahoma had jurisdiction over the property, though
the owner was a nonresident. Although the decision stated that the
business of a nonresident should not be exempted from making a
ratable contribution in taxes for the support of the government, it
cannot be interpreted as authority for taxing income of a non-
resident derived from exclusively interstate commerce.
3 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951).
4 Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939).
t Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
6 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
7 247 U.S. 231 (1918).
8 252 U.S. 37 (1920).
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A later case,9 following the United States Glue and Shaffer de-
cisions defined further the obligation of a foreign corporation to
share in the costs of local government. The test, stated this opinion,
is "whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal rela-
tions to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state."
In a word, has "the state given anything for which it can ask re-
turn?" 10 The taxing statute was upheld in this instance, but it must
be noted that the foreign corporation was locally licensed and
actually deriving benefits from the state. In effect, it had moved
into the state to carry on an intrastate operation.
The difference beween an unlicensed foreign corporation and a
licensed or qualified foreign corporation was discussed in a case
dealing with a sales tax levy." The case declared the levy unen-
forceable, though it was similar to a sales tax which had previously
been upheld.1 2 The distinction between the two cases was the fact
that in one case, the corporation maintained sales offices in the tax-
ing state, took contracts there, and made deliveries; while in the
other case all offices were maintained outside the state, sales made
out of the state, and the delivery consummated in interstate com-
merce. However, since the incidence of a sales tax falls on the
consumer, and not on the seller, such cases are not necessarily
controlling, or even guiding in the instant fact situation.
The concept established by the principal case is not actually as
revolutionary as some of the publicity accorded to it would imply.
The Supreme Court without opinion affirmed a California decision
upholding a comparable tax imposed upon income earned through
similar business activities.13 There, as in the instant case, the cor-
poration had not qualified to do business, but was merely maintain-
ing a sales office for the purpose of soliciting orders which were
accepted and filled from the home office. The salesmen did have
the additional authority to make adjustments and collections. The
California court based its decision on United States Glue Co. and
Shaffer as well as two other cases. 14 The Court found that these
cases established that the taxation of net income from interstate
commerce, as distinguished from the taxation of the privilege to
engage in interstate commerce, is not prohibited by the commerce
clause.
Other cases which have dealt with the question of the state
taxation of income from interstate commerce have concerned them-
selves with the fairness and reasonableness of the apportionment
formula established by the statute in question., The foreign cor-
porations involved have been domiciled in the taxing state, and the
issue whether they were subject to the income tax imposed has not
been in question. Substantial property had been employed in the
9 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435 (1940); see also Memphis Gas Co. v. Beeler, 315
U.S. 649 (1942) (allowed nondiscriminatory tax on net income of a foreign corporation having a com-
mercial domicile in the state or on income derived from within the state).
10 Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., supra note 9, at 445.
11 McLeod v. Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
12 McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940).
isWest Publishing Co. v. McColgon, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), off'd per curiam, 328
U.S. 823 (1946).
14 Bass, Ratcliff & Gretton v. State Tax Commission, 266 U.S. 281 (1924); Underwood Typewriter
Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U.S. 113 (1920).
15 Hans Rees' Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina, 283 U.S. 123 (1931); cases cited at note 16 supra.
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state in each case, so there was clearly an obligation to the state for
the protection, benefits and opportunities being given. This line of
cases established merely that the apportionment formula used must
be reasonably related to the local activities of the taxpayer.
The chief requisite of a fairly apportioned taxing formula is
that it minimize the possibility of the imposition of multiple tax
burdens on interstate activities. For this reason, most formulas
based upon gross receipts rather than net income have been declared
unenforceable by the Supreme Court.16 The distinction between a
tax based upon gross receipts and one based upon net income was
defined in the United States Glue Co. case.17 A tax upon gross re-
ceipts, is essentially one on each transaction, depending upon its
magnitude, whether or not an actual profit was derived from such a
transaction. A taxing formula based upon such amounts, imposes a
tax even though no income has been earned in connection with the
operations being taxed. Tax formulas which have been declared
invalid have a common characteristic-that is, the imposition on an
activity of a burden which is capable of being imposed by every
state that particular activity touches. 8 Gross receipts formulas have
been upheld when applied to an intrastate incident sufficiently dis-
joined from interstate activities so that it could be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the apportionment was fair, and the taxpayer
was free from the cumulative burden threat."
To reiterate the guiding principles established by the cases re-
viewed, the state may assess the fruits of interstate commerce, in
order to defray the costs of local government, providing it does so
through a channel which does not conflict with Congress' exclusive
power to regulate the commerce among the states. In order to meet
this requirement the taxable activities must be sufficiently localized
to establish a relationship with the state that brings them within
the state's taxing power, and the tax levy must not unduly burden
the free flow of commerce across state lines nor favor local com-
merce. Do the tax levies questioned in the instant cases meet these
tests?
Mr. Justice Whittaker, in a particularly sharp dissent, stated
that the past decisions in this area are "remarkably consistent," and
16 Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S.
434 (1939); Galveston, H. & S.A.R. Co. v. Texas, 210 U.S. 217 (1908).
17 247 U.S. at 328.
18 Western Livestock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
19 Norton Company v. Department of Revenue, 340 U.S. 534 (1951); Joseph v. Carter & Weekes




24 HOUR BREAKFAST AND LUNCH SERVICE
At 1649 Broadway Denver
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
careful analysis, understanding, categorizing, and application of
those decisions would result in a somewhat different conclusion.2 0
He noted that the following questions should be carefully examined
in applying the Court's opinions:
"(1) whether the tax was laid upon the general income of
a resident or domiciliary of the taxing State, (2) whether
the taxpayer's production, manufacturing, distribution or
management facilities, or some of them, were located in the
taxing State, (3) whether the taxpayer conducted both in-
trastate and interstate commerce in the taxing State, and if
so, (4) whether the tax was directly laid on income derived
from interstate commerce, or-what is the equivalent-on
the whole of the income, or whether the whole of the in-
come was used as one of the several factors in an apportion-
ment formula merely for the purpose of fairly measuring
the uncertain percentage or proportion of the total income
that was earned within the taxing State."'"
He distinguished all the cases relied upon in the majority opinion,
even the California case discussed above.2 2 In his opinion there
were certain activities which were purely intrastate. His reason for
dissenting was that the opinion was not based on precedent, but was
breaking new ground in an area expressly forbidden the states by
the commerce clause.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter joined with Mr. Justice Whittaker in
his dissent, and also added another reason for disagreeing with the
majority opinion."2 He found that taxation of the type of commer-
cial activity here involved would actively and unduly burden the
free flow of commerce among the states. His dissenting opinion
described the hardships that would be placed on thousands of small
and medium-sized corporations doing a small volume of business in
a number of states. The additional record-keeping requirements and
taxation costs, will, he felt, seriously impede interstate commerce by
discouraging selling in states where the volume does not justify the
inconveniences which will be involved. Another impediment will be
created through the increase of litigation involving the fairness and
reasonableness of apportionment formulas applied by taxing states.
In view of the extensive litigation now present in this area, this
argument is unquestionably valid.
Although the review of the cases has revealed that generally
the tax has been laid on a resident or domiciliary employing sub-
stantial property and capital in the state, this has not necessarily
been the test or guiding principle. Rather the test has been the
relationship between the commercial activity and the privileges and
protection provided by the state, coupled with the prohibition
against discrimination in favor of local commerce. 24 What brings a
commercial activity into the realm of the state's taxing power? The
case in question has found that the maintenance of a sales office for
2o 79 Sup. Ct. at 372.
21 Ibid.
22 West Publishing Co. v. McColgan, 27 Cal. 2d 705, 166 P.2d 861 (1946), aff'd per curiam, 328
U.S. 823 (1946).
23 79 Sup. Ct. at 379.
24 See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
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the solicitation of sales in the state "forms a sufficient nexus. '25
Yet, does a corporation which has not qualified to do business actu-
ally receive any benefits and protection from the state in which it
is carrying on its interstate business? The instant case holds that it
does, or at least it does if a substantial portion of the foreign cor-
poration's operations are transacted in the taxing state. What is
substantial? There has been no guide to help determine how sub-
stantial and voluminous such an operation must be in order to come
within the rule. Economists who have studied this question believe
that contacts such as the one now in question are too remote to
actually be considered as an integral part of the state's economy.
26
How far can the rule in this case be extended? Could it possibly be
construed to cover mail order operations and sales solicited by
traveling salesmen when there is no sales office located in the state?
These are some of the questions that will be coming up for further
litigation and determination by the courts.
From the economists' point of view, there are a number of valid
reasons why the rule established by this case can seriously impede
the free flow of commerce.2 7 One was mentioned by Mr. Justice
Frankfurter-that is, the inconvenience and expense of filing a
multitude of income tax returns. Also, there is the threat of creat-
ing multiple tax burdens. Another one mentioned was the ultimate
redistribution of tax resources throughout the states through the
divergent apportionment methods and the allowance of tax credits
by the various taxing authorities.
The solution suggested in Frankfurter's dissent is congressional
action which would restrict or impose well-defined limitations upon
the states' taxing powers in this area.2 8 This appears to be a stiff
measure, yet it comes within the power which is exclusively in Con-
gress if that body should wish to exercise it. In view of the fact that
thirty-five states have taxing measures which provide for a direct
tax levy on corporate net income, there is little question that many
organizations are going to find numerous new tax liabilities im-
posed upon them within the next few years. Probably the taxing
authorities in many states are going to find this source of revenue
is not sufficiently lucrative to make it worth the extra cost and
trouble of administering it. Yet, as they begin losing present sources
of revenue to other states, they may find it necessary to take ad-
vantage of this source. Unless some limitations are defined, there
will no doubt be some real effort to extend the effect of this decision
over situations far beyond the intention of the Court.
25 79 Sup. Ct. at 359.
26 Studenski and Glasser, New Threat In State Busines Taxation, Harv. Bus. Rev. Nov.-Dec., 1958,
p. 77.
27 Ibid.





Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Power-Legislature
Cannot Delegate Its Power to Define a Crime by Making Violation
of Rules and Regulations of Administrative Body a Crime.
By JOHN E. ARCHIBOLD
Casey was a defendant in a justice of the peace court prosecu-
tion for a misdemeanor arising from failure to obtain a trailer
court license. It was alleged that operation of his trailer court was
contrary to the rules and regulations of the Board of Health of
the Tri-County District Health Department. Violation of an order,
rule of regulation of a county or district health department was by
statute declared a misdemeanor punishable by fine up to $1000, one
year in jail, or both.' A jury returned a verdict of guilty. Appeal
was taken to the county court where the defendant was again found
guilty. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of Colorado held:
reversed. The legislature cannot lawfully delegate its power of
defining a crime to the district or county health departments by
declaring violations of their orders, rules and regulations to be
crimes. Such action contravenes Article III of the Colorado Con-
stitution. Casey v. People, 336 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1959).
The Casey decision is a further manifestation of the vigor with
which the rule against delegation of legislative power is applied in
Colorado. The prohibition against the delegation of legislative pow-
er is a corollary of the separation of powers into legislative, exe-
cutive, and judicial departments. With the rise of administrative
agencies, the courts have had to cope with the problem of how
much administrative discretion can be exercised by such agencies
without an improper intrusion into the legislative function. The
general principle was stated in the 1892 case of Field v. Clark:
"The Legislature (Congress) cannot delegate its power to make a
law, but it can make a law to delegate its powers to determine
some fact or state of facts upon which the law makes, or intends
to make, its own action depend."2 By this is meant that the legis-
lative body must declare its policy and establish sufficiently clear
standards within which the administrative body is to operate. The
principle of this case was strongly reiterated in all of the Colorado
cases cited in the Casey opinion.
In determining if the Field principle applies to the more spe-
cific issue of whether or not the legislative body can declare the
violation of a rule or regulation of an executive department or
agency to be a crime, a majority of federal and state cases have
taken a position contrary to that of the instant case. The United
States Supreme Court in 1911 upheld the power of Congress to de-
clare that violations of the rules and regulations of the Secretary
of Agriculture with respect to grazing and forest regulation would
be punishable.3 Since then there have been decisions upholding
punishment for violations of the rules and regulations of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue4 and the O.P.A. Administrator.5 Pun-
1 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 66-2-14(1) (1953).
2 143 U.S. 649, 694 (1892).
3 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
4 United States v. Tishman, 99 F.2d 951 (7th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 636 (1939).
5 United States v. Gruenwald, 66 F. Supp. 223 (W.D. Pa. 1946).
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ishment for disobeying an order of a local draft board has likewise
been sustained.' Apparently no federal case has held it to be an un-
constitutional delegation of power for Congress to declare that the
violation of a rule, regulation or order of a federal department or
agency results in a crime.
Although the Field principle has been more strictly applied
with respect to state cases, even here one finds that the Colorado
position exemplified in Casey is a minority one. A New York court,
upholding the conviction of a motorist who had violated a traffic
rule of the Palisades Interstate Park Commission, said that the le-
gislative policy declaring that violations of the rules and regula-
tions of the Commission would be misdemeanors was not an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power to define a crime. 7
The fact that the Director of Conservation of Alabama could change
the regulations "from time to time" did not deter the Alabama
court from upholding a criminal conviction under such regulations.'
The Missouri Supreme Court has said, "punitive laws or laws fixing
punishment as for violations of administrative rules are solely re-
ferrable to the legislative power and function, and an administrative
ruling may have the force of law in that violations thereof are pun-
ishable as public offenses.9 The Oklahoma Supreme Court has said
what is practically the same thing.10
Massachusetts and New York have not only upheld, respective-
ly, the power of the Airport Commission, and the Bureau of Smoke
Control, to prescribe rules and regulations backed by criminal sanc-
tions, but they have even gone so far as to allow the administrative
agencies to fix the penalty, "up to $500" in the Massachusetts case,1
and "between $25 and $100 for the first offense" in the New York
case.
12
A minimum fair wage standard order of the Commissioner of
Labor and Industry of New Jersey was upheld in Lane v. Holder-
man.13 A federal district court, construing a Colorado statute14 rel-
ative to the unfair cancellation of motor vehicle dealer franchises,
stated by way of dictum that it was permissible for an adminis-
trative body to make rules and regulations, the violation of which
is a crime, provided the legislature sets up a primary standard.15 A
Florida case has said that before a person can be charged with a
criminal offense for violating an order of an administrative board,
the statutory provision permitting such an order should be strictly
complied with. 6
The Casey decision apparently stands alone. The author has
been unable to discover any other decision, federal or state, where
an appellate court has flatly and without qualification denied the
6 United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 (E.D. III. 1942).
7 People v. Kontrowitz, 10 Misc. 2d 667, 173 N.Y.S.2d 213 (Rockland County Ct. 1958).
8 State v. Keel, 33 Ala. 609, 35 So. 2d 625 (1948).
9 Marsh v. Bartlett, 342 Mo. 526, 121 S.W.2d 737 (1938).
10 Atchley v. Board of Barber Examiners, 208 Okla. 453, 257 P.2d 302 (1953).
11 Commonwealth v. Diaz, 326 Mass. 525, 95 N.E.2d 666 (1950).
12 People v. Bevevino, 202 Misc. 723, 112 N.Y.S.2d 647 (N.Y.C. Magis. Ct. 19521
13 40 N.J. Super. 329, 123 A.2d 56 (App. Div. 1956).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-11-14(10)(c) (Supp. 1957).
15 General Motors Corp. v. Blevins, 144 F. Supp. 381 (D. Colo. 1956).




power of the legislative body to declare that the violation of the
rules and regulations of an administrative body shall be a crime.
One cannot reasonably quarrel with the result in the Casey case,
for to allow a district health department to make rules and regula-
tions at will without a proper legislative standard, and then to make
a violation of such rules and regulations a crime, is a clear and un-
questioned disregard of the principle of Field v. Clark. The Casey
decision, in the opinion of the author, would have been more sat-
isfactory if it had been couched in terms of the legislature's failure
to prescribe sufficiently clear standards within which the county
and district health departments could lay down reasonable rules
and regulations. Had the legislature done this, its declaration that
violation of those rules and regulations would constitute a mis-
demeanor would not seem so objectionable. We can be grateful that
the Supreme Court of Colorado has not emasculated the sound
constitutional barrier against the delegation of legislative power,
as the New York and Massachusetts courts seem to have done.
Nevertheless, the language of the Casey opinion is unnecessarily
broad. Because of its failure to recognize careful distinctions, the
opinion puts Colorado out of step with other courts. This being so,
Casey stands as a weak precedent, and with the increasing import-
ance of governmental agencies, the Supreme Court of Colorado at
some future time may have to limit this ruling.
Constitutional Law - Double Jeopardy - Due Process
By EARNEST E. SCHNABEL
The defendants were indicted by the State of Illinois for violat-
ing an Illinois statute making it a crime to conspire to injure or
destroy the property of another.' Upon pleading guilty, each was
sentenced to three months imprisonment. Thereafter they were in-
dicted in a federal district court on a charge of violating a federal
statute2 by conspiring to willfully and maliciously injure or destroy
means of communications controlled or operated by the United
States. The defendants were found guilty as charged, although the
same criminal act had been involved in the first conviction. The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on the de-
fendants' claim that since the same acts were involved in the prior
state conviction they were twice put in jeopardy contrary to the
fifth amendment.3 The Court affirmed the second sentence, in a six
to three decision, holding that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
provision is not applicable to successive state and federal prosecu-
tions. Abbate v. United States, 79 Sup. Ct. 666 (1959).
The opinion of the three dissenting Justices declared that iden-
1 II. Rev. Stat. ch. 38 § 139 (1957). It provides in pertinent part: "If any two or more persons
conspire or agree together . . . with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to
injure the . . . property of another . . . they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy .... ".The
statute applies to conspiracies within Illinois to destroy property outside the state.
2 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1952) provides in pertinent part: "If two or more persons conspire . . . to
commit any offense against the United States . . . and one or more of such persons do any act to
effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."
3 The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment provides: "nor shall any person be subject
for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "
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tical conduct of an accused is but one offense, and cannot be pun-
ished by two separate sovereignties as two distinct offenses.
On the same day the principal case was decided, the Court, in
Bartkus v. Illinois,4 held that the subsequent trial of the defendant
in a state court, based on the same acts which had resulted in an
acquittal in a federal court, did not deprive the defendant of due
process under the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Brennan, who
wrote the majority opinion in the Abbate case, dissented, in a five-
four decision, on the theory that the state trial of Bartkus was
essentially a second federal prosecution because of the extremely
active participation of federal officers in preparing and conducting
the trial. Such a second prosecution is, of course, barred by the
double jeopardy limitation on the national power.
Constitutional challenge to successive state and federal prose-
cutions based on the same conduct is not new to the courts.5 In
Houston v. Moore,6 an 1820 case, the defendant was indicted in a
state court for violating a state statute. His conduct was also a
crime against the national government. The Court discussed the
possibility of successive prosecutions, but upheld the defendant's
conviction on the ground that the state had concurrent jurisdiction
as long as the national government had not exercised its power.
In Fox v. Ohio,' United States v. Marigold," and Moore v. Illi-
nois,9 the Court, relying on the Houston case, gave clear expression
to the emerging principle that the fifth amendment double jeopardy
clause does not prohibit a federal prosecution which follows a state
prosecution for the same offense. The reasoning of the Court in
these cases was approved in principle in later Supreme Court deci-
sions.10
Climaxing this development was United States v. Lanza,"
where the issue of successive jurisdiction was squarely before the
Court. It was there held that the fifth amendment applied only to
successive prosecutions by the federal government. Subsequent
cases have reaffirmed the decision.1
2
It should be remembered that the principal case was a six to
three decision. This decision centered around the holding in the
Lanza case, which the Court refused to overrule. It pointed out that
if states were free to prosecute persons violating their laws, and thus
bar subsequent federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal
law enforcement would necessarily be hindered. A disparity would
arise when the defendant's acts impinged more seriously on the fed-
eral interest than on a state interest. An example is found in the
principal case: the state court sentenced each defendant to three
4 79 Sup. Ct. 676 (1959).
5 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 49 Mass. 313 (1844); Harlan v. People, 7 Doug. 207 (Mich.
1843); State v. Brown, 2 N.C. 100 (1794); State v. Antonio, 2 S.C. 776 (1816); Hendrich v. Common-
wealth, 32 Va. 707 (1834).
6 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 19 (1820).
7 46 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847).
850 U.S. (9 How.) 258 (1850).
9 55 U.S. (14 How.) 306 (1852).
10 These later decisions all affirm the principle in dicta only. See, e.g., Sexton v. California, 189
U.S. 319, 322-23 (1903); Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1892); United States v.
Ariona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, (1886); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 518 (1878); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 550 (1875).
11 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
12 Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1944); Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101 (1942);
Westfall v. United States, 274 U.S. 256 (1927); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312 (1926).
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months, while under the federal conviction each received one to
three years.
The dissenting opinion was critical of the decision in Lanza as
being based on dicta in prior cases. 13 These cases had assumed that
identical conduct might be prosecuted twice because the offense
punished by each was in some sense different. But the Justices in
the minority objected that the legal logic used to prove one act to
be two was too subtle for them to grasp. They would not accept the
majority view which saw no way out of the difficulty posed by a
state prosecution being allowed to destroy the federal power to
bring suit. In answer to the majority argument that a defendant
could plead guilty to the crime in the jurisdiction which provided
the lesser minimum penalty, the dissent pointed out that Congress
has the power to declare certain conduct criminal. Further, hav-
ing defined the crime, it could take exclusive jurisdiction for the
federal government, or allow states concurrent jurisdiction while
still setting minimum penalties applicable in all courts.
It was pointed out that the Bill of Rights, which safeguards
against double jeopardy, was intended to establish a broad national
policy against a federal court's trying an accused a second time after
a final judgment in any other court. The dissent noted that during
the first Congress when the Bill of Rights was being considered, a
proposed amendment, which was not adopted, apparently would
have barred double prosecutions for the "same offense" only if
brought under any laws of the United States.
1 4
The Bartkus case relied on the reasoning of the majority-
minority opinions of the principal case for the basis of its holding.
The only difference from Abbate is that in Bartkus there was an
acquittal in the federal court, and a subsequent conviction in the
state court for the same acts.
The history of court decisions relating to successive state and
federal prosecutions, whether in violation of the fifth or fourteenth
amendments, hinges upon the interpretations given by the courts in
the earlier cases of Houston v. Moore" and Fox v. Ohio.16 There is a
definite conflict as to the proper meaning of these cases. But with
regard to the result, there is little doubt. Our constitutional protec-
tions embodied in the double jeopardy and due process clauses have
been limited by the Court's holdings in the Abbate and Bartkus
cases.
13 See note 10 supro.
14 At the time the amendment was offered, the double jeopardy clause read: "No person shall
be subject . . . to more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense." 1 Annals of Cong.
434 (1789). Had the amendment passed, the clause would read: "No person shall be subject . . . to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense by any law of the United States." Id. at
753.
15 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 19 (1820).
1646 U.S. (5 How.) 213 (1847).
Constitutional Law - Equal Protection of the Laws - Cruel and
Unusual Punishment - Rights of Prisoners
By WILBUR SATO
Plaintiff, an inmate in a state prison, filed a complaint in a fed-
eral district court with an accompanying motion to proceed in forma
pauperis. Specific allegations of the complaint, taken as true for the
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purposes of the motion, showed that the plaintiff was being subject-
ed to systematic segregation and discrimination solely on account of
his race. This, he contended, violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. He prayed that the
respondent prison officials be enjoined from continuing the alleged
abusive practices, or in the alternative, that he be transferred to
another prison where such practices did not exist.
Leave to proceed in forma pauperis being discretionary, the
court examined the merits of the claim, and concluded that, in view
of the extraordinary nature of the relief sought, the acts charged
did not show sufficient interference with the plaintiff's constitu-
tional rights to justify judicial action. Leave to file the complaint
in forma pauperis was denied. Nichols v. McGee, 169 F. Supp. 721
(N.D. Cal. 1959).
The court reasoned that the rationale of Brown v. Board of
Education' should not be applied to state penal institutions because
the extent and quality of the difficulties of prison administration
are not to be found in educational systems. This position was sup-
ported by citing authorities to the effect that federal courts are
loath to interfere with the discretion of officials charged with
administration of state prisons.
The constitutional guarantee of equality commands that a state
shall not enforce segregation solely on the basis of race,2 nor provide
for discrimination in publicly owned or supported facilities.3 Under
this rule racial discrimination is not to be allowed in public schools,'
buses,5 or in recreational6 and cultural7 facilities. Nor is it permissi-
ble in a privately created and supported orphans' school adminis-
tered by a public trustee.8 The state may not enforce a racially
restrictive covenant, 9 nor entertain a suit to recover for its breach."0
Nor may ownership of land be prohibited on the basis of race or
national origin.1' The right to engage in a business or occupation,"
or to practice one's profession 1 3 similarly may not be denied. Suf-
frage1 4 and immigration matters" are within the rule. A person
is denied due process of law in a criminal trial when members of
his race have been continuously and systematically excluded from
the jury lists. 6 The state cannot discriminate in the right to public
employment or compensation' 7 nor prohibit the association of races
by discriminatory zoning laws.'t And it has been held, although
not without dissent, that the state may not prohibit the marriage
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Tate v. City of Eufaula, 165 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Ala. 1958).
3 Easterly v. Dempster, 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
4 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5 Browder v. Gayle, 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956).
6 Moorhead v. Fort Lauderdale, 152 F. Supp. 131 (S.D. Fla. 1957).
7 Harris v. Daytona Beach, 105 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1952).
8 Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
O Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
10 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
11 Fulii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
12 Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm., 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
13 Harvey v. Morgan, 272 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
14 McDonald v. Key, 224 F.2d 608 (10th Cir. 1955); Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947);
Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129 (E.D. La. 1950).
15 Quan Hing Sun v. White, 254 Fed. 402 (9th Cir. 1918).
16 Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 471 (1954).
17 Reynolds v. Board of Public Instruction, 148 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1945).
18 City of Birmingham v. Monk, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950).
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of persons of different races.19 This constitutional mandate also
provides that there be no discrimination because of race in the
punishment for a crime.
2 0
Equal protection of the laws, thus expressed, commands that
the exercise of state power in all its varied activities and pursuits
shall operate equally upon all, without regard to race, color, or na-
tional origin. The rationale of Brown v. Board of Education is not
limited to the facts of that case. And of course the broad policy of
the equal protection clause is not limited in application to educa-
tional institutions.
The statement that federal courts are loath to interfere with
the administraion of state prisons is misleading. Close examination
of the cases cited as supporting the proposition, where courts have
refused to intervene, discloses that this is the apparent rather than
the real reason for their refusals. Thus in Wagner v. Ragan21 the
Seventh Circuit said that it had no power to control or regulate the
ordinary internal discipline of prisons. In Adams v. Ellis22 it was
stated that withdrawal of rights in prisons is justified by considera-
tions underlying the prison system. Yaris v. Shaughnessy 23 held
that the complainant had not made out a case serious enough to
require court interference.
In Piccoli v. Board of Trustees2 where the petitioner was de-
nied the use and possession of law books he had purchased, the
court refused to hear an application for equitable relief, declaring
that only manifest oppression will justify judicial intervention, and
intervention may be had only to prevent irreparable injury that is
clear, imminent and substantial. From a reading of these and other
cases 25 the implication is clear that, though the courts, as a matter
of policy, are reluctant to intervene, prison administration will be
left to prison officials only so long as their conduct does not involve
deprivation of prisoners' constitutional rights or amount to treat-
ment that is clearly arbitrary or capricious. Thus in Davis v. Berry
2
the petitioner sued in federal disLrict court to restrain prison offi-
cials from performing a vasectomy on him. He alleged that the con-
templated operation violated the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The court concluded that the statute purporting
to authorize the operation denied due process, as alleged, because it
provided for the deprivation of a right without hearing, and further
that the effect of the operation was to impose cruel and unusual
punishment. Finding also that irreparable harm was threatened, the
court granted relief. Other cases27 hold that prison rules that inter-
fere with prisoners' rights of appeal or deny access to the courts
violate the equal protection clause.
19 Perez v. Lippold 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P.2d 17 (1948). Contra, Miller v. Lucks, 203 Miss. 824,
36 So. 2d 140 (1948).
20 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
21 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954).
22 197 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1952).
23 112 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
24 87 F. Supp. 672 (D.N.H. 1949).
25 Morris v. Igoe, 209 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1953); Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir.
1952); Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954); McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957); Akomine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 2d 294, 238 P.2d 606 (1951).
26 216 Fed. 413 (D.C. Iowa 1914).
27 Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Ex parte Hall, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
The enunciated principles of specific cases appear to place the
rights contended for in the main case within the protection of the
Constitution. Equality of protection implies that in the administra-
tion of criminal justice, no one shall be subjected, for the same class
of offense, to any greater or different punishment from that to
which others of the same class are subjected.2 8 Greater or different
punishment imposed on persons because of their race is therefore
prohibited.2 9 Due process of law contemplates that freedom from
cruel and unusual punishment be protected.3 0 Cruel and unusual
punishment has been defined as a changing concept which must
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark
the progress of a maturing society.
3 1
An examination of the facts 6f the instant case leaves little
room for doubt as to the application of the law. The allegations of
the complaint charged that the plaintiff was required to join in an
exclusively Negro line formation when proceeding to his assigned
cell block for daily lockup; that he was there lodged in an exclusive-
ly Negro cell; that he was required to join an exclusively Negro line
when proceeding into the prison dining hall; and that he was re-
quired to eat in a walled-off and exclusively Negro compartment in
the dining hall.
Though there is here no rack or thumbscrew, those are not the
only forms of cruel punishment.3 2 The degradation, humiliation, and
mental suffering imposed here can, in its consequences, be more
painful and more destructive than the most brutal physical abuse.
The harm is irreparable. This form of punishment is incongruous in
a society where equality before the law is a fundamental right. That
systematic segregation is also unequal protection is plain, for the
prisoner must, because of the segregation of his race, daily undergo
humiliation and mental suffering not shared by other prisoners.
Both reason and the Constitution oppose a palpably arbitrary and
capricious prison policy. In this care the defendant prison officials
made no appearance, and no justification for the offending rule was
mentioned. The plaintiff's claim clearly merits consideration.
28 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 335 (1921).
29 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 584 (1883).
3o Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 462 (1946); Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 255 (3rd Cir. 1949).
31 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
82 Ibid.; Davis v. Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (D.C. Iowa 1914).
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Negligence-Automotive Repairers-Liability To Third Persons.
By SVEN L. JOHANSON
Plaintiff, a stranger to a repair contract between the defendant
garage and the lessor of a tractor unit, alleged that he suffered dam-
ges to his trailer when, due to the negligent repair of the tractor,
the tractor-trailor unit plunged off the highway. The defendant had
agreed with the lessor to do certain repair work on the tractor, and
improper connection of the right tie rod to its wheel after repairs
were completed caused the loss of control by the driver. The de-
fendant contended that the evidence failed to show privity of con-
tract between the plaintiff and defendant, or any duty owed to the
plaintiff by the defendant. The novel question before the Kansas
City Court of Appeals was whether the court should extend to auto-
motive repairers the doctrine of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'
Held: Judgment for the plaintiff; privity of contract between the
parties is not requisite to recovery. Central & So. Truck Lines v.
Westfall GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W.2d 841 (K.C. Ct. of App., Mo.
1958).
The liability of negligent automotive repairmen to third parties
is now rapidly becoming accepted as the prevailing rule. It follows
the MacPherson doctrine by twenty-two years. In that leading case,
the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Cardozo, ruled that a man-
ufacturer owes the affirmative obligation to exercise reasonable
care in the manufacture of a chattel which is not necessarily dan-
gerous when made properly, but which may place life and limb in
peril when made negligently. If such manufacturer knows that the
chattel is likely to be used by persons other than the purchaser,
without subsequent tests, he is heldresponsible to such third parties
irrespective of a contract relationship.
Dean Prosser has stated2 that requiring privity of contract is the
result of misunderstanding the holding of Winterbottom v. Wright.,
He further has asserted that this is now but ancient history, and
that later decisions are agreed that negligent repair of a vehicle 4 or
any other chattel5 creates a liability in favor of third persons in-
jured by that negligence, as if the repairman had made and sold the
chattel in the first instance.
In Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp." the plaintiff was a pilot of
an airplane which the owner had requested the defendant to inspect
and repair. Defendant returned the plane after two weeks, thereby
impliedly warranting its fitness. Soon afterward, it crashed on a
take-off because of the defendant's negligent failure to make proper
1 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 Prosser, Torts 517 (2d ed. 1955).
3 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842). Here the defendant had contracted to keep certain mail coaches in
repair, and by reason of his failure to do so, a third person, the driver, not a party to the contract,
was injured.
4)Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th cir. 1939); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456,
46 S.E.2d 197 (1948); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N.Y. Supp. 657
(1933).




inspection and repairs. The trial court, on the ground that the com-
plaint failed to state a cause of action upon which relief could be
granted, refused to find for the plaintiff. The appellate court re-
versed, saying pontifically, "This concept of non-liability was
spawned in the dicta of a breach of contract case and nourished in
the perpetration of the false notion that privity of contract is an in-
dispensable prerequisite to a manufacturer's actionable duty to
third parties."7 The 1946 case of Carter v. Yardley & Co." reviews
the history and transformation of the so-called "general rule."9
The Winterbottom case held that under the principles of con-
tract law there are many instances when a party is without remedy,
and hardship will not be sufficient justification to allow recovery.
"Hard cases, it has been observed, are apt to introduce bad law." 0
These early cases did not recognize a duty, outside of contract, for
the protection of a third person, except where there was nuisance,
or in rare cases involving a public duty. It was said that the only
safe rule was to confine the right of recovery to those who are
bound by contract, otherwise there would be no end to the absurd
and outrageous consequences that would result. The "obvious and
simple" solution to the plaintiff's plight was to make himself a party
to the contract. We now find this doctrine inconceivable, and fail-
ure to exercise reasonable care in the performance of an act which
will affect some right of others, may result in a recovery in tort,
whether that act be one of commission or omission.
In a federal case", which was decided for the plaintiff, the de-
fendant was under a contract to keep in repair the trucks used by a
construction company. Plaintiff, a laborer on a company job, was
seriously injured when struck by one of the trucks. It had been im-
possible to warn him because the truck's horn was not operating.
Omission to keep the horn in working order was sufficient to estab-
lish the defendant's liability. The court held that inasmuch as the
truck was returned to the defendant each night for servicing there
was notice of the defect, and the defendant had a duty to exercise
reasonable care. The negligent breach of that duty created a lia-
bility for the resulting injury.
In Hanson v. Blackwell Motor Co.,2 a garage contracted with
the owner of an automobile to repair a defective steering mechan-
ism. The garage failed to repair the defect but erroneously informed
the owner that it had been repaired when he later returned for the
car. On a trip the next day, a passenger was injured when the
steering apparatus failed and the automobile was wrecked. The
court refused to find a breach of duty to the injured passenger for
a mere omission to act.
There is a widely accepted position, consistent with that ap-
7 id. at 480.
8 319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E.2d 693 (1946).
9 See also Annot., 164 A.L.R. 569 (1946).
10 Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 406 (1842).
11 Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th cir. 1939).
12 143 Wash. 547, 255 Pac. 939 (1927).
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proved by Prosser,"8 which maintains that any person will be liable
who repairs personal property in such a negligent manner as to
render it likely to cause injury or property damage to third per-
sons. If, however, such repair is made, and the article returned to
its owner's exclusive possession and control in a condition not im-
minently dangerous, and the article is employed without event for
a reasonable period of time, injuries to third persons resulting from
the use of the article thereafter, will not expose the repairman to
liability.
Generally, in automotive repair cases, acceptance of the auto-
mobile by the owner is not a valid defense when the repair was not
known to be defective. In the first of two cases in point'1 4 the agents
of a motor company left a steering arm adjustment tool attached to
the automobile. It was held that the company could not escape lia-
bility for injuries sustained by the owner's guest. The defendant
had argued that the company was an independant contractor whose
repair work had been accepted by the owner. In the second case 15
the defendant alleged that the owner had accepted the automobile
upon completion of the work, and therefore the owner should be
substituted for the defendant as the party responsible to the plain-
tiff for any defect. The court held that the defendant repairman
would be held liable for the damages sustained by both the auto-
mobile owner and the plaintiff in the absence of proof that (a) the
work was completed and accepted by the owner, and (b) the owner
knew of the defective repair when he accepted the automobile, or
should have discovered the defect before the accidnt.
In Smith v. Roberts,16 the plaintiff, driver of a truck recently
repaired by the defendant, was approaching the bottom of a
down-grade when he discovered that the truck had no brakes. The
truck gained speed until it went out of control and was wrecked,
causing serious personal injuries to the plaintiff. The defendant
averred that there was no privity of contract between him and the
plaintiff as to repair of the truck and that the plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence. The court found no negligence in the con-
duct of the driver and held the defendant liable for the injuries
which resulted from the defective repairs.
Nine states"7 seem to allow recovery by third persons for dam-
ages and injuries due to negligent automotive repairs. The Colo-
rado Supreme Court has not yet considered a case of this nature. It
would seem however, in view of the prevailing trend, and, inasmuch
as there is a complete absence of recent opposition, that Colorado
would follow the principle of the instant case.
13 Prosser, Torts 517 (2d ed. 1955); 65 CJ.S. Negligence § 101 (1950).
14 Burket v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316 (1938).
15 Zierer v. Daniels, 40 NJ. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1956).
16 268 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. 1953).
17 Hudson v. Moonier, 102 F.2d 96 (8th Cir. 1939) (failure to keep truck horn functioning;
substantive low of Mo.); Spolter v. Four Wheel Broke Service, 99 Cal. App. 2d 690, 222 P.2d 307
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (wheel lug bolts not secured); Moody v. Martin Motor Co., 76 Ga. App. 456, 46
S.E.2d 197 (1948) (negligent repair of steering gear and brakes); Smith v. Roberts, 268 S.W.2d 635
(Ky. 1953) (negligent reassembling of rear housing); Miller v. Margot, 42 So. 2d 916 (La. 1949)
(improper replacement of a tie rod); Burkett v. Globe Indemnity Co., 182 Miss. 423, 181 So. 316
(1938) (failure to rrmove a tool attached to the steering arm); Central & So. Truck Lines v. Westfall
GMC Truck, Inc., 317 S.W. 841 (Mo. 1958) (improper replacement of tie rod); Zierer v. Daniels, 40
NJ. Super. 130, 122 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1956) (negligently repaired brakes); Oliver v. Bereano, 293
N.Y. 930, 60 N.E.2d 134 (1944) (brakes); Kalinowski v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 26r
N.Y. Supp. 657 (Sup. Ct. 1933) (wheel came off); cf. Vrooman v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 183 F.2d 479
(10th cir. 1950) (failure to repair and inspect airplane; applying Kansas law).
DICTA
MAY-JUNE 1959
Negligence - Municipal Liability -
Failure to Provide Police Protection
By JOHN E. HARRINGTON
In response to a request for information contained in an F.B.I.
circular, Arnold Schuster informed the New York City police of the
whereabouts of Willie Sutton, a professional criminal of national
repute whom he had by chance seen on the street. As a result of
this information Sutton was arrested and Schuster's part in his
apprehension was given wide publicity. Almost at once Schuster
began receiving anonymous threats against his life. The police ar-
ranged protection for him at his place of employment and his home,
although they informed him that the calls were from cranks and
were "child's stuff." After several days the protection was with-
drawn and shortly afterward, nineteen days after Sutton was taken
into custody, Schuster was fatally shot by an unknown assailant.
The complaint in the instant wrongful death action alleged that
Schuster's death resulted from the actionable negligence of the city
in failing to use reasonable care for his safety. On appeal, the judg-
ment of the trial court granting the defendant's motion to dismiss
the complaint was reversed. Held: The complaint stated a cause of
action. Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N. E.2d 534
(1958).
An ancient tenet in all systems of law is that which assures the
immunity of the sovereign from being called to account in his
courts.' But the erosion of modern interpretation has changed the
outline of this precept. In American law, absent a statute, a munici-
pality is liable for injuries resulting from negligent acts of its ser-
vants in the performance of proprietary duties but not for those
incurred in the performance of a governmental function. 2 The duty
to furnish police protection is a governmental function and not
merely corporate in character.'
Moreover, for some years prior to the instant case, New York
has had a statute which divested the state of immunity from suit.
4
As it is well settled that "none of the civil divisions of a state...
has any independent sovereignty,"'5 this statute makes the munici-
pality liable, equally with individuals and corporations, for wrongs
of its agents and employees."
Posed as the ground for the decision in the instant case is the
rule that, "If conduct has gone forward to such a stage that inaction
would commonly result, not negatively merely in withholding a
benefit, but positively or actively in working an injury, there exists
.a relation out of which arises a duty to go forward.
7
Mr. Justice McNally based his concurring opinion on the slight-
ly different common law doctrine that once the defendant has as-
1 Kawanonakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
2 Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 Ore' 213, 88 P.2d 808 (1938).
3 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958).
4 New York Penal Code, § 8. "The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and action
and hereby assumes liability and consents to have the same determined in accordance with the same
rules of law as applied to actions . . . against individuals or corporations ... "
5 Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 365, 62 N.E.2d 1 604 (1945).
6 Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 54, 64 N.E.2d 704, 705 (1945).
7 Schuster v. City of New York, 5 N.Y.2d 75, 154 N.E.2d 534 (1958), quoting from Mach v. Rens-
selaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 166, 159 N.E. 896, 898 (1928).
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sumed to act, a duty arises to act carefully, even though the protec-
tion may have been gratuitous in the beginning and not the result
of a duty.8
One must assist in capturing a felon when opportunity presents,
at least When called upon to do so. This was written into our law
as early as 1285, in the Statute of Winchester.9 It is in response to
this duty, restated by the New York Penal Code, 10 that strict liability
is imposed upon the municipality for injury or death incurred by
one while helping the police at their direction. The facts of the in-
stant case place it outside the provisions of this law inasmuch as
Schuster volunteered his services, and his death occurred some days
later, but the policy which underlies the statute is clearly one of
solicitude for the safety of those private persons who aid the author-
ities in the exercise of the police function. It cannot be said that the
duty in the present case is solely in the interest of the person con-
cerned. It arises also from the need of the government, "that its
service shall be free from the adverse influence of force . . . 1
In New York, nonfeasance as well as misfeasance may constitute
negligence,1 2 and perhaps the Schuster decision was dictated by the
simple necessity of recognizing a duty of the municipality toward a
private citizen who by his affirmative act had aligned himself on
the side of the community, and whose representation should be giv-
en an opportunity to prove he lost his life as a proximate result of
the city's later failure to act in his behalf.
What would be the probable outcome of a Colorado case pre-
senting a fact situation similar to Schuster? McAuliffe v. City of
Victor" was a case of first impression in Colorado regarding the
question of municipal negligence in exercise of the police power,
and the Court reluctantly distinguished the possible liability arising
from negligence involving a proprietary function from the non-
liability of the municipality where a governmental function is at
issue. The Colorado Court followed this line until 1952 when two
decisions moved away from the doctrine of sovereign immunity as
it applies to contract actions.' 4 In the more recent case of Ace Fly-
ing Service v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,15 the Court accepted
the principle that when the state enters into authorized contractual
relations it thereby waives immunity from suit. But the non-liabil-
ity for negligence in the governmental capacity established by prior
cases 6 was unaffected by this decision.
8 154 N.E. 2d at 541 (concurring opinion). And see Marks v. Nambil Realty Co., 245 N.Y. 256, 258,
157 N.E. 129, 131 (1927); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 233, 236, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (1922).
9 Babington v. Yellow Cab Co., 250 N.Y. 14, 164 N.E. 726 (1928) (dictum).
10 New York Penal Code § 1848: "A person who, after having been lawfully commanded to aid
an officer in arresting any person . . . willfully neglects or refuses to aid such officer is guilty of a
misdemeanor. Where such command is obeyed and the person obeying it is killed or injured . . . the
person . . . so injured . . . or the personal representative of the person so killed shall have a cause
of action . . . against the municipal corporation by which such officer is employed ... "
11 In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536 (1894); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662 (1884).
12 Meistinsky v. City of New York, 309 N.Y. 998, 132 N.E.2d 900 (1956); McCrink v. City of New
York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E.2d 419 (1947).
13 15 Colo. App. 337, 62 Pac. 231 (1900).
14 Boxberger v. State Highway Dep't, 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); State Highway
Dep't v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952).
15 136 Colo. 19, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
16 Walker v. Tucker, 131 Colo. 198, 280 P.2d 649 (1955); Atkinson v. Denver, 118 Colo. 322, 195
P.2d 977 (1948); Barker v. Denver, 113 Colo. 543, 160 P.2d 363 (1945); McIntosh v. Denver, 98 Colo.
403, 55 P.2d 1337 (1936); Moses v. Denver, 89 Colo. 608, 5 P.2d 581 (1931); Veraguth v. Denver, 19
Cola. App, 473, 78 Pac. 539 (1904).
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In Colorado Racing Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n,1 7 which fol-
lowed Ace Flying Service by two months, the Colorado Supreme
Court cut loose entirely from the traditional sovereign immunity
doctrine insofar as contract actions were concerned, saying: "In
Colorado 'sovereign immunity' may be a proper subject for discus-
sion by students of mythology but finds no haven or refuge in this
court." 18 This could be only a persuasive dictum if applied in a case
involving liability under the police power, but it is permissible to
speculate that the vigor of the statement and its unqualified nature
presage a wider application of the view than a limitation to contract
law. This seems the more likely in view of Mr. Justice Moore's con-
curring opinion in Ace Flying Service stating that even in a tort
action the doctrine of sovereign immunity is contrary to the Colo-
rado constitutional guarantee of due process.1"
Perhaps Colorado will arrive at the same destination through
case law as that reached by New York through statute, 0 and require
the state to come into court in its own defense on equal footing with
all other contestants. But would Colorado courts place a duty upon
the municipality absent a statute imposing liability on the munici-
pality for injury resulting from intervention in the police function
at the direction of the police? Would a solicitation to act be seen in
the posting of a "wanted" circular, and a reciprocal duty on the part
of the community to protect the responding citizen?
The Schuster case is limited to a narrow segment of the law
and it seems unlikely that its specialized facts would soon be liti-
gated in another forum. The case is an interesting illustration of
the application of basic tort duty and negligence principles in a
novel fact situation, but it would be a rare case that could not be
distinguished from it through either the non-voluntary nature of the
informant's action or the quality of the protection given him by the
city. It seems likely that in future cases involving similar facts a
distinction will be made along these lines, with the courts following
the traditional view that nothing in the law imposes a special duty
upon the police to protect an individual citizen, and concluding that
there can be no liability where there was no duty.
17 136 Colo. 279, 316.P.2d 582 (1957), 34 DICTA 422.
18 Id. at 284, 316 P.2d at 585.
19 Ace Flying Service v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 29, 314 P.2d 278, 283 (1957)
(concurring opinion).
20 New York Penal Code, § 8.
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Witnesses - Competency - Husband and Wife -
Incompetency as Witness Against Spouse in Criminal Prosecution
By FRED J. MYERS
James Hawkins was indicted under the Mann Act 1 for trans-
porting a female in interstate commerce for immoral purposes.
When the government put Hawkins' wife on the witness stand to
testify against him, his counsel objected to her competence as a
witness. The objection was overruled and she was allowed to tes-
tify. She testified that she was a prostitute both before and after
her marriage to Hawkins. The defendant admitted that they had
never lived together for any appreciable length of time. On appeal,
the admission of the wife's testimony was held to be error. The
public policy of maintaining peace and harmony in domestic rela-
tions required the court to reaffirm the rule barring testimony of
one spouse against the other. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 78
(1958).
Neither this comment nor the Hawkins case contemplates the
privileged communication between husband and wife.2 Rather, both
refer to the rule regarding the competence of one spouse to testify
against the other.
At common law the wife was incompetent as a witness either
for or against her husband.3 An accused was disqualified as a wit-
ness on his own behalf because he was an interested party. It fol-
lowed from the legal fiction that husband and wife were one, that
she also was incompetent as a witness for .him. This does not ex-
plain why she could not testify against him. The reason is un-
known, but it has been suggested 4 that the most logical explanation
is to be found in the loyalty owed to th! husband as the head of the
paternalistic feudal family. Whatever the reason, the rule was well
settled. This does not mean that it was without exception, for it was
equally well settled that the rule did not apply when the husband
committed an offense against the person of his wife.
5
The rule and its exception were recognized early in this country
by the Supreme Court of the United States.6 Since that time both
have been greatly modified. In Funk v. United States7 the court
held that one spouse could testify for the other. The reason given
was that all disqualifications because of interest had been abolished.
Since an accused could now testify in his own behalf, there was no
longer any reason to bar the testimony of the spouse.
The exception has been made more inclusive. Originally it re-
ferred to crimes against the person of the wife. Bigamy is now
considered a crime against the wife." Importing an alien for im-
moral purposes is by statute made a crime against the wife.' Under
1 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1952).
2 On that subject, see B Wigmore, Evidence J 2332 (1940).
8 Id. § 2227.
4 Ibid.
5 Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 129 (1839).
6 Ibid. E
7 290 U.S. 371 (1933).
8 Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304 (1880).
9 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1952).
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the Mann Act, the transportation of one's own wife in interstate
commerce for immoral purposes makes her a competent witness
against the husband." A crime has been committed against the
wife in the corrupting of her morals.-
The rule of disqualification has not been completely destroyed.
The instant case makes it clear that the present federal rule still
holds a wife incompetent to testify against her husband over his
objection when the crime is not one against her person.
The states are not completely in accord. A small but growing
minority of them have abandoned the rule. 12 Colorado is moving
away from the rule by a broader interpretation of the exception.
The pertinent Colorado statute 3 was first enacted before the turn
of the century and has been re-enacted verbatim ever since. In
Schell v. People4 the Supreme Court of Colorado held that bigamy
is a crime against the wife and allowed her to testify against her
husband. In Wilkinson v. People 5 the defendant was indicted for
the rape of his step-daughter. His wife, the girl's mother, was al-
lowed to testify against him. The court indicated that any rape by
the husband would be a crime against the wife. Logically it would
seem that the only crime committed against the wife, if any, would
be having intercourse with another woman. In O'Loughlin v. Peo-
ple'6 the defendant wife had murdered her step-son and her husband
was permitted to testify against her. The Colorado Court upheld the
conviction saying that the reason for the existence of the privilege,
the maintenance of domestic peace and harmony, had ceased to exist
in this case and therefore, the testimony was rightly received. The
court also said, in referring to the Wilkinson case, that if rape of a
step-daughter is a crime against the other spouse, then so is murder
of a step-son. By broadening the exception Colorado has moved fur-
ther from the spirit of the rule, and has taken a stand toward the
forefront of the growing view.
The facts of the Hawkins case presented the Supreme Court
with an opportunity to change the federal rule and they failed to
do so. There was no domestic peace or harmony to preserve. The
Hawkins' relationship was more that of procurer and prostitute
than husband and wife; therefore, in this case there was no reason
for maintaining the rule. The government wanted to modify the
rule by transforming it into a privilege, not of the accused, but of
his spouse. She would then be competent to testify over his objec-
tion, but not be compellable by the government. This would not
destroy the domestic peace and harmony of any marriage worth
savi.g and would aid the discovery of all pertinent facts.
l0 Hays v. United States, 168 F.2d 996 (10th Cir. 1948); Pappas v. United States, 241 Fed. 665
(9th Cir. 1914).
1-1 This would appear to be true regardless of the wife's moral character prior to the transporta-
tion in interstate commerce; no case was found which discusses her prior character.
12 For a survey of the varied state rules see Note, 38 Va. L. Rev. 359 (1952).
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 153-1-7(1) (1953). The pertinent language reads: "A husband shall not be
examined for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or against her husband without
his consent; . . . but this exception does not apply . . . to a criminal action or proceeding for a
crime committed by one against the other."
14 65 Colo. 116, 173 Pac. 1141 (1918).
15 86 Colo. 406, 282 Pac. 257 (1929).
16 90 Colo. 368, 10 P.2d 543 (1932).
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